In 1995 Russia and most of the other post-Soviet states were able to avoid major domestic disturbance, although this was often achieved by consolidating the elements of authoritarianism, undermining the emergence of civil society and the rule of law, and downgrading the principles of human rights and democratic government. Even so, the political élites seemed increasingly to proceed from the assumption of the need to have their power legitimized by popular vote.

President Boris Yeltsin's administration continued to proclaim its commitment to reform and consolidation - although the reforms increasingly amount to the redistribution of property among and within powerful interest groups and the emerging market economy is highly centralized, bureaucratized, corrupt and criminalized. The government claimed some successes in financial stabilization and a lower rate of decline of industrial production, but was under constant pressure because of the danger of social unrest and the threat of the restoration of the 'old regime'. Against this background, elements of outward assertiveness can be seen both as a compensation for domestic failures and as a manifestation of the government's responsiveness to the success of its political opponents.

The war in Chechnya continued to be the most painful development. Large-scale hostilities and violence continued, homes and civilian property were destroyed, hostages were taken and a considerable refugee problem developed. Efforts at political settlement were incoherent and Moscow used all available means to preserve Russia's integrity - a signal which seems to be both inward- and outward-oriented.

The other conflicts on the territory of the former USSR continued in less confrontational forms than in the recent past, Tajikistan being the dramatic exception. Russia has become less erratic and more pragmatic in its policy, has stopped undermining the territorial integrity of its CIS partners and has denied support to separatist forces and pressured them to accept autonomous status within federative-type arrangements. The CIS countries are expected to repay this through loyalty to Russia - in some cases up to the point of accepting its military presence on their territories.

While welcoming the symbolic involvement of the UN and the OSCE in peace-settlement efforts, Russia aims to consolidate its own role as the most efficient external pacifier and the major actor in the conflict areas. It has proceeded from the principle that the post-Soviet space is an area of vital national interest to it and has succeeded in getting de facto recognition of this by the international community.

Strengthening Russia's position in some strategically important areas of the 'near abroad' is a high priority. Special emphasis is given to consolidation within the CIS framework, both politically and militarily. Russia has signed over 200 military-related agreements with the CIS countries; 36 were concluded in 1995, including those creating a joint air defence system and promoting cooperation in protecting the external CIS borders.

Developments within the CIS in 1995 have contributed to enhance Russia's role, but there is no reason yet to regard the CIS as an emerging superstructure which could come to resemble the USSR or even re-establish it as the 'USSR minus the Baltics'. The CIS states are not being subordinated to Russia's leadership; acceptance of its prominent role co-exists with a cautious but persistent search for alternatives by almost all the actors in the area. Nor are there sufficient grounds to consider the CIS as a multilateral military alliance in the making.

Russia's increasing role in the post-Soviet space could contribute to international stability by marginalizing conflicts and reducing their scope. Russia seems to consider this as instrumental to other goals, such as consolidating its great-power status, counterbalancing NATO enlargement and changing the former Western-oriented policy line. This would not necessarily mean re-establishing a confrontational pattern in Russia's relations with other countries, but might allow it to take a more independent stance in the international arena with a more diversified political agenda.

Homepage

---