A Review Conference of the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention), often referred to as the 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention, was held in Vienna in 1995, with two additional sessions in 1996. The CCW Convention entered into force in 1983. It is an 'umbrella treaty' to which specific agreements can be added as protocols. Protocol I prohibits the use of any weapon whose primary effect is to injure by fragments which cannot be detected in the body by the use of X-rays. Protocol II restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, and aims to prevent or reduce civilian casualties caused by these devices during and after hostilities. Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary devices.

The CCW Convention has attracted relatively few adherents; by 31 December 1995, 57 states had ratified it. Paradoxically, a number of African and Asian states (e.g., Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Somalia) that have suffered greatly from the effects of inhumane conventional weapons, mainly land-mines, are not yet parties to the Convention. Some of these states participated as observers at the Review Conference together with other non-parties. Representatives of nearly 70 NGOs followed the proceedings and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) submitted reports and working papers and organized symposia and working groups prior to the Review Conference. The NGOs and the ICRC launched international media campaigns to ban anti-personnel mines.

The main tasks of the Review Conference were: to strengthen the provisions of Protocol II on the use of land-mines, booby-traps and other devices; and to consider the proposal for an additional protocol to restrict the use of certain laser weapons. Only the second task was completed, and an additional protocol was adopted - the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons to the CCW Convention, or Protocol IV. It prohibits the use of laser weapons that are specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision and the transfer of blinding laser weapons to any recipient. Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of military use of other laser systems, including lasers used against optical equipment, is exempt from the prohibition and the production of blinding laser weapons has not been outlawed.

Although the military utility of blinding laser weapons is limited, the adoption of Protocol IV was an important achievement. Blinding is a particularly abhorrent way of wounding the enemy and is more debilitating than most battlefield injuries because sight provides 80-90% of a person's sensory stimulation. Protection against the threat of blinding laser weapons is virtually impossible. This is the first time that both the use and the transfer of a specific weapon have been banned by the international humanitarian law of armed conflict.

The concluding session, held in May 1996, ended with the adoption of a revised text of Protocol II. The new text prohibits the use—in both international and non-international armed conflicts—of anti-personnel land-mines which cannot be detected with the generally available de-mining equipment. The use of non-detectable mines will still be allowed during the so-called 'grace period' which may exceed a decade. The revised Protocol II encourages the production and employment of mines equipped with self-destructing and self-deactivating mechanisms. However, modifications in the construction of mines, which may be delayed for many years, cannot significantly reduce the number of casualties caused by these weapons. Over 30 governments, including the US Government, have expressed themselves in favour of a total, internationally verified ban on anti-personnel land-mines. It remains to be seen whether and, if so, when and where they will engage in negotiations for such a ban.

Homepage

---