The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was given indefinite duration at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, and a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime appeared to be attainable. However, tensions within the regime over non-compliance questions and between treaty parties over progress towards nuclear disarmament became more visible and acute. While the legal foundations of the regime were made permanent, its objectives and the steps that could be taken to reinforce it are likely to cause debate over whether the main task of the regime is to prevent nuclear proliferation by the non-nuclear weapon states within it or to facilitate the disarmament of the five declared nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) and the removal of the ambiguity that surrounds the nuclear weapon status of India, Israel and Pakistan.

This debate dates from the mid-1960s, when the NPT was being negotiated, but is acquiring enhanced prominence, in part because of the steady increase in the number of parties - from the first NPT Review Conference in 1975 until the end of 1995. In addition, Brazil, a non-NPT party, has accepted commitments equivalent to NPT membership by bringing the regional 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force in its territories.

Three non-NPT states with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities - India, Israel and Pakistan - are not parties to the NPT or a regional nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Near-universal adherence to the NPT has placed them in a more politically visible position than before, enhancing pressure on them to move away from their ambiguous nuclear stance, as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa have done, and isolating them politically. India displays symptoms which could be interpreted as a willingness to undermine the regime by its principled rejection of the NPT.

Demands for the nuclear weapon states to engage in an unambiguous, even time-bound programme of disarmament are being strengthened, and pressure is increasing on India, Israel and Pakistan to clarify their status and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The core of the disputes over the NPT is the demand that the division between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states be eliminated. Disarmament agreements that will reinforce and extend the existing non-proliferation regime by constraining nuclear weapon potentials and inventories are being sought. Measures which can contribute to the disarmament of the existing nuclear weapon states and place constraints on states which remain outside the NPT - e.g. a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a fissile material production cut-off - have acquired near-universal support and thus become attainable political goals.

The activities of at least three non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT - Iran, Iraq and North Korea - were the subject of close scrutiny and accusations of non-compliance, highlighting the issues of how the rules of the non-proliferation regime should be specified and enforced, the basis for imposing restrictions on exports to NPT parties, and the desirability of changing the conceptual basis and the detailed application of the system of safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After the experience with Iraq, NPT parties were prepared to expand the role of the IAEA safeguards system and to accept enhanced monitoring of their nuclear activities. In addition, two new nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties are in existence in Africa and South-East Asia, while the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco is about to come fully into force. The nuclear non-proliferation regime can be argued to have been immeasurably strengthened in the five years since 1990.

This judgement may be seen as superficial by the end of the century if some current trends continue. The isolation of India, Israel and Pakistan is a danger. Difficult choices lie ahead, particularly for the nuclear non-proliferation policies of the USA. Strategies for dealing with NPT non-compliance and restraining the nuclear proliferation activities of states outside the treaty may lead to judgements that incentives are necessary to influence their behaviour, even if this runs counter to global norms and consensual rules and appears to reward regime renegades. US policies towards Iran and North Korea, and the international dissonance that has accompanied them, illustrate the consequences of the discrimination that can arise from this source. Yet such contradictions appear almost inevitable if effective policies are to be designed to handle the future nuclear weapon scenarios in South Asia and the Middle East.

The utility of nuclear weapons in roles other than deterring their use is increasingly questioned. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference may mark the start of the final stage in making the existing NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime universal and the end of the first stage in the construction of a regime to facilitate a world free of nuclear weapons.

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