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HomepageMultilateral regimes are in place to govern the supply of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, nuclear materials and technology, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology. In 1995 changes occurred in the membership of the military-related export control regimes: Romania became the 29th member of the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons); and Brazil, Russia and South Africa became members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), bringing its membership to 28. New Zealand and South Africa became members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), increasing its membership to 31. Even so, at the end of 1995 membership of the regimes was still confined to 34 countries.
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established, subject to approval of the member governments, in December 1995 at a meeting of high-level officials of 28 states. This regime is expected to be established formally in 1996. In the EU, the regulation developed to address exports of dual-use technologies entered into force on 1 July 1995. With these two events, the emphasis of multilateral export regulation has been expanded to include new categories of goods and technologies.
The process of harmonizing membership across the regimes is an interesting aspect. In the area of transfers of nuclear materials and technology, during the cold war period the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were involved in development of the NSG. The other regimes, however, were founded around a core group of states which were associated with the system of alliances and security arrangements led by the United States. Since the end of the cold war, the membership of regimes has gradually been harmonized until, by the end of 1995, most of the former members of the WTO and the European states that were neutral or non-aligned during the cold war had become members of one or more of the multilateral regimes.
Moreover, in recent years members of the regimes have increasingly emphasized those activities that set the terms and conditions on which technology transfer can occur rather than the denial aspects of export controls.
As a result of changes in technology and markets, the regulation of international technology transfer is increasingly seen by governments as a collaborative exercise. Regimes provide them with a forum for discussion, exchange of information, lobbying and bargaining in support of national policy objectives.
Government objectives can be of a political nature (the US preference), economic or narrowly focused on non-proliferation concerns. There is no consensus within any of the regimes that they should attempt to coerce states whose political behaviour is considered unacceptable by regime members. However, the USA does use its export regulations in this way and is a central actor in each of the multilateral regimes. On 15 March 1995 President Bill Clinton expanded US sanctions against Iran to include a ban on all trade and investment, including the purchase of Iranian oil by US companies. The action was explained by Secretary of State Warren Christopher as part of a wider policy 'to use our diplomatic and economic measures and our military deterrent to contain Iran and to pressure it to cease its unacceptable actions'. These 'unacceptable actions' included proliferation concerns but also included actions not related to proliferation. Specifically, the charges are that Iran is 'the foremost sponsor of international terrorism' and that it 'seeks to undermine the Middle East peace process'. While other governments object to aspects of Iran's behaviour - particularly its opposition to the Middle East peace process - there is a dispute about how to attempt to change it. Some members of the regimes favour a policy of 'critical dialogue' with Iran.
It is with chemical and biological weapons that international responsibility to prevent proliferation is greatest because of the universal prohibition of the use, development, production and transfer of these weapons through the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The particular status given to nuclear weapon states in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - which has no equivalent in the CWC or BWC - has made it more difficult to secure comprehensive membership of the NPT. There is no multilateral convention or treaty that addresses the issue of ballistic missile possession or use.
In 1995 some governments continued to argue that the activities of the Australia Group are not consistent with Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which relates to economic and technological development and commits the states parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not prohibited by the convention. (Several governments argue that, since export controls are a barrier to trade, they cannot be consistent with this commitment. However, since export controls are given expression through national legislation (whose legitimacy is not questioned), the abolition of the regimes could make trade regulation less rather than more efficient, with even greater barriers to technology transfer.) Moreover, if there were no regulations that sought to prevent unwanted forms of proliferation, some states - notably the USA - might argue for other measures (perhaps including the use of force) to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The debate on CWC Article XI reflects the misunderstanding or, alternatively, the lack of trust between 'North' and 'South'.
Regimes also address technologies which are neither inherently military in character nor directly associated with a weapon system but which could have military applications. Secure and effective communications are a crucial factor in successful military operations. For this reason digital communications systems dedicated to military application usually require export licences. It is often said that there has been a convergence between military and civil telecommunications technology or that civilian technology is superior to (rather than just different from) military technology in this area. The question therefore arises whether a country that would be denied a licence for a military communications system can achieve the same capabilities by purchasing unlicensed civilian technologies.