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Security and conflicts The
trends reported . . . may be summed up as changes in the nature
of the Euro-Atlantic security community combined with challenges
to the unity and coherence of Euro-Atlantic (or Western)
values. . . . The most optimistic overall interpretation would
be that the world is witnessing the turbulence involved in the
movement towards a multi-polar system, cushioned by the globalization
process which increasingly pushes towards a single world security
and economic agenda. The most pessimistic would be that a corner
is being turned towards deinstitutionalization and towards a
world governed by power play, the nature of which is as unstable
in the longer term as it seems unipolar in the short term. There
was also evidencefor the conflicts surveyed and perhaps
for some others, including cases within Europethat
concern about being designated as a terrorist group did have
a significant impact on the behaviour of at least some non-state
armed groups and political movements. [T]he
UN initiated two peace-building operations [in 2002], UNAMA and
UNMA, which were given stronger mandates and more resources than
earlier political and peace-building missions. They are multi-dimensional,
encompassing all the aspects of peace-building immediate
humanitarian relief assistance, institution building, law and
order functions, and economic recovery. .
. . the USA succeeded in destroying terrorist bases in Afghanistan,
dismantling most of al-Qaedas infrastructure in the country
and removing the Taliban regime from power . . . [but] key Taliban
and al-Qaeda leaders (probably including bin Laden and possibly
Mullah Omar) and significant numbers of al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters
remain at large, . . . support for the new central government
is weak, and political and military power remains in the hands
of the countrys regional, ethnic and clan leaders. The
1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan dramatically worsened
the security situation for over a billion people in the subcontinent.
Since then the two countries have continued to engage in a slow
but steady arms race . . . and a gradual consolidation of nuclear
weapon infrastructure. Nuclear use doctrines are taking shape.
There have also been two major military crises, both prominently
featuring nuclear threats. [I]nstitutional
and technical accomplishments notwithstanding, progress in improving
the EUs military capabilities has been only moderate. It
is impeded by, among other things, the lack of strategic answers
to the questions of what the rationale for the ESDP is and what
the real needs of the Union in the security field are.
Maintaining
a focus on security sector reform within and beyond the enlarged
boundaries [of NATO and the EU] may provide the best guide through
the risks and opportunities inherent in the enlargement of these
key multilateral organizations. [I]f
donors focus on the application of good governance principles
to the military sector rather than on the level of spending,
the argument of political interference in domestic affairs of
recipient countries carries much less weight and even becomes
less sensitive. Military spending and
armaments [C]ontemporary
changes in the security environment and . . . thinking on security
. . . call for changes in the very notion of security, moving
from a narrow concept of military, state-centric security, towards
broader and deeper security concepts. [T]he
acceleration [in world military expenditure] in 2002 is due almost
exclusively to the huge increase in US military expenditure under
the Bush Administration. . . . A review of global expenditure
trends shows that the rest of the world is not prepared, or cannot
afford, to follow the USAs example in increasing military
expenditure at the current level or for the same purposes. It
is clear that in periods of rapid change it may be difficult
for governments to keep pace with the strategies developed by
companies for R&D, production, sales and marketing, which
sometimes evolve much faster than governments are able to develop
new policies. Just
as much risk as opportunity accompanies the arrival of cruise
missiles and UAVs [unmanned air vehicles] as powerful military
instruments. . . . As a consequence, the growing threat of cruise
missiles and UAVs underscores the need not just to develop suitable
defences but also improved non-proliferation policies. It
is uncertain how important anti-terrorist activities will be
for the future trend in transfers of major weapons. . . . [M]ajor
weapons might not be the most effective means for fighting terrorism.
Non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament While
bilateral and multilateral treaties cannot carry the full weight
of managing international security problems, arms control continued
to play an important role as one instrument of security policy
in 2002. [T]he
key issue to be addressed is not whether particular treaties
and regulatory arrangements have failed. Rather, it is how to
deal with states which deliberately violate their obligations
under these treaties and the norms underlying them. Many
of the efforts to constrain or ban the development, production
and use of CBW agents have focused on traditional multilateral
arms control and disarmament agreements. There is, however, an
increased reliance on national and ad hoc cooperation measures
among like-minded states on specific issues of concern to meet
perceived CBW threats, including those posed by non-state actors. European
arms control remains by far the most advanced regime of its type
worldwide. . . . Conventional arms control has become an integral
part of an inclusive, cooperative security system that needs
to evolve in parallel with changes taking place in Europe. In 2002 two interrelated discussions increased the political salience of export controls . . . how to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures . . . [and] the role of export controls in managing weapon programmes of concern. |
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