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| by
Ian
Anthony About the author |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: During the
1990s multilateral discussions influenced and guided nations
in the process of revising national export controls. These controls
are intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological
and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as delivery systems for these
weapons, and to minimize the risk that transfers of conventional
weapons and related dual-use items may undermine security. Cooperation
helped many states to improve their national export control systems
and enhanced the effectiveness of the wider non-proliferation
regime. In 2002 two
interrelated discussions increased the political salience of
export controls. First, discussions continued over how to increase
the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. Second, the
role of export controls in managing weapon programmes of concern
was further discussed. Illustrating
the impact of combating terrorism, the Australia Group, previously
the loosest of the multilateral arrangements, agreed a set of
licensing guidelines including a ‘catch-all’ provision
(the first time that a multilateral regime had taken such a step)
and a commitment to control the intangible transfer of knowledge
and technology. The strengthened guidelines adopted by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in December 2002 were an example of adaptation
in response to the threat of terrorism. The second
issue is familiar within export control and has been the subject
of discussions for the past decade. In this case it is more a
question of greater political awareness of developments. Members
and representatives of the multilateral cooperation arrangements
are spending a greater share of their time on explaining their
activities to a wider group of states with which they may be
able to develop cooperation, and beginning to consider how the
legislation developed during the 1990s can be implemented and
enforced effectively. The boundaries
between domestic and international dimensions of security as
well as between the military and non-military aspects of security
have become increasingly difficult to draw within the European
Union. EU reform and the enlargement of membership are changing
the context in which these changes are considered. While the
EU is progressively developing a distinctive approach to security
policy, including in the area of non-proliferation and export
control, this approach is more the product of uncoordinated decisions,
each following its own logic, than the pursuit of a coherent
plan. Current developments suggest the need for a review of EU
approaches to managing non-proliferation and implementing export
controls. The enlargement
of the EU is a further step towards developing what Javier Solana
has called ‘a safe haven of democracy and peace’, in
which differences are resolved peacefully within agreed institutional
structures. While free
association within the EU is one benefit of integration, the
free movement of goods and people also carries certain risks.
Realizing the benefit depends on developing and implementing
common approaches to managing these risks. A short-term challenge
to the development of this safe haven is the presence of groups
that may commit terrorist acts within the borders of the EU or
exploit EU territory to prepare and finance such actions elsewhere.
The EU has
facilitated wider changes in export control. In recent years
candidate countries have worked to modify their national export
control systems in ways that make them compatible with EU rules
for both dual-use items and conventional arms. Those countries
that will be the new neighbours of an enlarged EU include Belarus,
Ukraine and countries in South-Eastern Europe that could already
benefit from discussions about how EU export controls function.
The catch-all
provisions included in the guidelines for exports of sensitive
chemical or biological items introduced by the Australia Group
in 2002 might not have been introduced had they not already been
part of EU law. After enlargement, about 70% of the participants
in the multilateral export control regimes will be subject to
a common EU legal framework. As this framework evolves, it may
influence further regime development and the national policies
of countries that interact with but do not participate in informal
multilateral export control. The international
community has devoted increased attention in recent years to
the question of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Several
initiatives have been launched to investigate how best to address
the issue. One such initiative was brought to fruition in November
2002 when over 90 states declared their readiness to subscribe
to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation. However, this can only be described as a partial
success as several states with missile development programmes
decided not to join the initiative. Appendix 18B contains the full text of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation |
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