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| by
Shannon
N. Kile About the author |
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* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) In 2002 concerns
about the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime moved
to the fore of the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda.
There were signs that strains within the principal legal foundation
of that regime, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), were
building up to a breakdown. In May 2002
Russia and the USA signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT). This marked a breakthrough in a strategic arms
reduction process that had been deadlocked since the signingand
subsequent failure to enter into forceof the 1993 START
II Treaty. Unlike cold war agreements which set out carefully
balanced limits on strategic nuclear arms accompanied by detailed
verification provisions, SORT gives the two parties unprecedented
flexibility in implementing what amount to parallel, unilateral
force reductions. At the same time, SORT marks a fundamental
change in the nature of the arms control process. The treaty
is one part of a more comprehensive bilateral package deal.
This deal not only includes a strategic restraint component,
but also extends beyond arms reductions to encompass positive
measures. These measures include improved political consultation
and coordination, particularly with regard to combating terrorism
and halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
as well as increased economic and scientific cooperation. In December
2002, President Bush announced that he had ordered the Pentagons
Missile Defense Agency to begin deploying an initial missile
defence system in 20042005 to meet the near-term
ballistic missile threat to the USAs homeland,
deployed forces and friends and allies. The announcement
marked the first time that the Bush Administration had defined
an initial BMD capability to protect US territory and committed
to a specific deployment date. It followed in the wake of the
USAs formal withdrawal earlier in the year from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). It provoked immediate,
albeit relatively restrained, expressions of concern from China
and Russia about the implications of the USAs deployment
decision for global stability. At the same time, however, Russia
continued to press for inclusion in the missile defence plans
of the USA. Appendix
15A, by Hans M. Kristensen and Shannon N. Kile, contains tables
of the nuclear forces of the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China,
India, Pakistan and Israel. Appendix
15B, by Ted Molczan and John Pike, contains tables of operational
military satellites. |
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