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| by
Dennis M. Gormley About the author |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: While over
75 000 anti-ship cruise missiles are deployed by more than 70
countries worldwide, only about 12 industrialized countries currently
produce land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)— most notably
exemplified by the US Tomahawk. However, this class of cruise
missile is expected to proliferate widely by the end of the decade.
More readily available now is the unmanned air vehicle (UAV),
which seems likely to become a significantly more prominent means
of precise weapon delivery. The Predator reconnaissance UAV has
been adapted by the USA to carry two Hellfire missiles and was
used in Afghanistan and Yemen to attack al-Qaeda targets. The use of
armed Predator UAVs by the USA raises important questions about
the kind of expanded roles that UAVs may be adapted to perform
in the future and, more immediately, to what extent other countries
or terrorist groups might emulate US actions and transform their
own unarmed UAVs or piloted light aircraft into unmanned weapon-delivery
systems or crude terror weapons. UAV and cruise missile proliferation
makes an answer to this question urgent. The arming
of the Predator reconnaissance UAV illustrates the potential
for UAVs to become reusable weapon-delivery vehicles. Target
drones, employed as air targets for test purposes, are also UAVs
that could be converted into weapon-delivery vehicles. Given
the explosive growth anticipated in UAV systems over the next
decade, there will inevitably be increased pressure—led
by the USA—to create more flexible, less restrictive, rules
governing the export of unarmed UAVs and unmanned combat air
vehicles (UCAVs). If adverse inter-national security implications
are to be avoided, or at least minimized, effective non-proliferation
policy must be elevated to a truly complementary role alongside
defence acquisition and security planning. Participants of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have now agreed precise
ground rules for calculating the range of LACMs. However, other
problems remain regarding the transfer of complete LACMs and
large UAVs, as well as critical component technologies. The non-proliferation
problems are challenging. They merit the highest level of attention
within affected governments. Because existing MTCR provisions
can be adapted to achieve better controls on cruise missiles
and UAVs, the MTCR will remain the best tool available to slow
the scope and pace of missile proliferation. In considering the
merits of various alternatives to the MTCR, the non-proliferation
community should recall the MTCR’s many successes in slowing
the qualitative spread of ballistic missiles. |
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