![]() |
![]() |
|||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||
| by
Wuyi
Omitoogun About the author |
||||||||||||
|
* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: The 1990s
witnessed a strong interest in military spending in Africa by
external actors, especially donors of economic aid to the continent.
Three main factors accounted for this: first, the end of the
cold war allowed donors to become involved in non-traditional
matters such as national security and the cost of maintaining
military establishments; second, the widespread armed conflict
in Africa; and third, the establishment of a linkage between
good governance and development in the 1990s, which led development
actors to question 'excessive' or 'unproductive' expenditure,
such as military spending, at the expense of the social sector
and the alleviation of poverty. The initial
policy choice of donors to force a change in priorities in public
sector spending was to impose a predetermined level of military
spending in recipient countries. However, this policy had the
unintended consequence of increasing the secrecy surrounding
military budgets in aid-dependent countries which wanted to hide
the true cost of their military expenditure, and thus reduced
the reliability of the military expenditure data on which donors
judgements were based. Another deficiency
of the policy of imposing a maximum level of military spending
on recipient countries was that it did not take into consideration
the legitimate security needs of the countries concerned. Having
realized the limitations of the level approach, from 1997 donor
countries began to discuss alternative ways of addressing the
issue of excessive military spending. By the early
2000s a new approach emerged, articulated primarily by the British
Department for International Development (DFID). This approach
emphasizes the process of arriving at military spending rather
than the level of military spending. It also emphasizes the importance
of applying sound financial management principles to the whole
of the public sector, including defence. However, the process
approach has not been universally accepted by donors and its
details are yet to be fully understood by all donor countries. A SIPRI study,
launched in 2001, has examined the processes of budgeting for
the military sector in eight African countries with a view to
understanding how military spending decisions are made, and how
to contribute to the improvement of the processes for military
sector management in these countries. The study identifies a
number of challenges that must be overcome before the process
approach can take root as a tool of military spending management.
These challenges include the need for proper policy development
in the military sector in the countries as a necessary first
step towards an integrated defence planning system. The absence
of a defence policy in many of the countries hinders planning
and makes budgetary allocation to defence ad hoc. The problem
is partly lack of expertise and partly lack of an enabling environment.
To correct this, many of the states require capacity building
not just in the defence sector but also in the other policy areas
that defence interacts with. Institutions
that need to be strengthened include the parliament, the ministries
of finance and defence, and the audit departments. Another major
challenge is the need to develop clear rules to guide the budgeting
process and to specify clear roles for the various actors involved.
A third major challenge is to overcome the lack of transparency
in the military budgets. There is a need to have a sufficiently
detailed budget that will allow for proper scrutiny of every
aspect of the budget. This challenge is as much a problem of
capacity as it is a result of lack of policy. These challenges have several implications for donor countries, including a need for enhanced policy dialogue between them and recipient countries on how to correct existing deficiencies in order to boost the chances of the process approach taking firm root. Furthermore, helping to address some of the present shortcomings in the systems will require long-term commitment as opposed to the short-term initiatives donors are used to. |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||