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| by
Marina Caparini About the author |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Security sector
reform (SSR) is a globally applied concept calling for the enforcement
of good governance norms in all aspects of security policy making
and implementation (i.e., not just military defence activities).
Within Europe, both NATO and the EU have sought to promote democratic
standards in the defence and security sphere and have placed
this among the criteria for accession candidates. At the same
time, however, both organizations have set positive objectives
of reform and capability building in the same dimensions. The
imminent entry of a large number of new members to both organizations,
coupled with the impact of the new global agenda focusing on
terrorism and proliferation control, makes it timely to review
the way ahead for SSR in the larger European area. NATO’s
concrete targets for military reform in applicant countries were
clear, but have not been fully realized either before or (in
the case of the three Central European countries already admitted)
after accession. Modernization of defence structures, technology,
financing, and public understanding and support all remain problematic
points within the countries of this region. NATO’s new concentration
on out-of-area deployments, and its call for ‘niche’
contributions to these, may have the effect of dividing Central
European defence establishments into a relatively sophisticated,
small, deployable capacity and a majority of underpaid and under-equipped
territorial forces. For the new set of candidates due to accede
in 2004, NATO has adopted an improved set of accession goals
and a better coaching process, but may also have diluted the
strictness of its conditions somewhat in order to permit the
wide-ranging incorporation of territory dictated by the post-11
September 2001 agenda. The EU has
been particularly strict in demanding that all its new members
scheduled to accede in 2004 should demonstrate their ability
to enforce the full ‘Schengen’ system of border control
and internal security cooperation (from which some existing members
have been allowed to opt out). This reflects concerns about the
pressure of illegal migration, smuggling, crime, and so on, on
the Union’s extended eastern borders. Given the relatively
weak development of scrutiny and democratic control mechanisms
both at the European level and within the new democracies, however,
this pro-security emphasis risks tilting the balance in member
states against the protection of their citizens’ and foreign
residents’ human rights. Potential problem areas in this
respect include asylum, immigration and refugee policies, inadequate
support for national police, and attitudes towards non-EU neighbours.
The continuing pressure to strengthen the EU’s anti-terrorism
and migration control capacities means that this problem will
not quickly go away. Both NATO
and the EU—and in their own contexts, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe—will
have to consider how to develop SSR as an element in their policies
towards ‘new neighbours’ in the east, south-east and
south after enlargement. The new frontier zones from Minsk to
Morocco are strategically and culturally diverse but all have
below-average standards of security governance, and it is not
yet clear how far the methods of leverage which achieved improvements
within the existing round of NATO/EU entrant countries can take
effect in these different environments. Devoting more resources
to SSR as a part of ‘outreach’ is desirable, but also
means withdrawing resources from Central European countries before
the corresponding reforms on their own territories are soundly
anchored. Ultimately, the challenge of monitoring and enforcement
within the enlarged institutions could only be met by more clearly
defining the SSR norms applicable to all their members. In sum, NATO and the EU have sought, and to a considerable extent achieved, SSR goals in Central Europe through the medium of a conditional accession process, and have shown the value (in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy) of addressing these issues through a multilateral authority. It has not been altogether possible, however, to keep political distortions out of the process or to avoid ‘mixed messages’ resulting from the institutions’ concurrent demands for—constantly evolving—performance standards in the fields of military intervention and security enforcement. Maintaining a focus on SSR within as well as beyond the enlarged boundaries may provide the best guide through the risks and opportunities inherent in the enlargement of these key multilateral organizations. |
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