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| by
M. V. Ramana and Zia Mian About the authors |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Since the
1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have been through a war
and a major military crisis, both prominently featuring nuclear
threats, making clear that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan
has not made conventional war obsolete. Both states have pushed
forward with establishing the institutions, doctrines and delivery
systems required to deploy their nuclear arsenals. Emboldened
by the tests, in 1999 Pakistan’s army and political leaders
sent Islamist militants and troops across the Line of Control
near the town of Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir. After two months
of bitter fighting, and intervention by the USA, the troops were
withdrawn. Pakistani leaders believe that, while they failed
to fulfil their anticipated military or political objectives
in the Kargil war, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons prevented
India from launching a massive military attack across either
the Line of Control in Kashmir or the long international border.
For Indian
leaders, Pakistan is clearly seen to have lost the Kargil war,
especially politically. Nonetheless, the war inspired a search
for ways to wage limited war against Pakistan that would not
lead to the eventual use of nuclear weapons. At the same time,
the Indian military has been conducting training exercises with
scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. The December
2001 militant attack on the Indian Parliament triggered a major
crisis that stopped short of war, including a tense stand-off
for several months involving over half a million troops. Indian
politicians, media commentators and military personnel called
for India to follow the USA’s lead in unilaterally bombing
Afghanistan without a UN Security Council resolution and attack
facilities in the part of Kashmir held by Pakistan. Since India
did not actually conduct any military attacks, Pakistan claimed
this as further evidence of its nuclear deterrent at work. For
Indian leaders, Pakistani President Musharraf’s promise
in January 2002 to rein in the Islamic militant organizations
that fight in Kashmir is seen as proof that India’s ‘coercive
diplomacy’ worked. Indian leaders also emphasize that the
military crisis forced the international community to recognize
Pakistan’s support for terrorism. The fact that
the lessons taken from the Kargil war and the 2002 crisis by
leaders in the two countries have been so very different has
important implications for the future of South Asia. The USA
may be a possible source of instability in a future crisis. Indian
leaders may believe that the USA would intervene to prevent Pakistan’s
use of nuclear weapons. India and
Pakistan have been taking steps towards gradually making their
nuclear arsenals operational. In 2003 India set up a Nuclear
Command Authority to manage a proposed nuclear triad. An official
nuclear doctrine emphasizes the retaliatory capability of its
nuclear weapons. It has also claimed the right to nuclear retaliation
if India is attacked using chemical and biological weapons. Following
the other nuclear weapon states, semi-official documents have
suggested that India should develop: (a) sufficient, survivable
and operationally prepared nuclear forces; (b) a robust command
and control system; (c) effective intelligence and early-warning
capabilities; (d) planning and training for nuclear operations;
and (e) the will to employ nuclear weapons. Pakistan set
up a National Command Authority in February 2000. Statements
by officials and retired officials suggest that Pakistan would
try to match India in posture and that it would use its nuclear
weapons if: (a) India attacks Pakistan and takes a large part
of its territory; (b) India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s
armed forces; (c) India imposes an economic blockade on Pakistan;
or (d) India creates political destabilization or large-scale
internal subversion in Pakistan. Currently,
neither country is believed to keep its nuclear weapons mounted
on missiles and ready for launch. However, recurring crises and
the growing familiarity of the military in both countries with
nuclear weapons is likely to generate pressures for deployment
of nuclear weapons with a launch-on-warning posture—with
the attendant grave risk of accidental nuclear war. Public opinion in the region is in flux. Hindu nationalist groups in India and Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan have repeatedly called for the use of nuclear weapons. An active peace movement has emerged in both India and Pakistan, with national coalitions of civil society groups working for nuclear disarmament and peace. |
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