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| by
Sharon
Wiharta About the author |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Multilateral
peace missions in 2002 underwent several important changes, many
of which were central to their nature and make-up. Not only did
the missions initiated in 2002 follow the new trend of smaller,
short-term and mandate-specific missions, but they also tended
to play more of a peace-building role and have an advisory function
for the host governments. The substantial
progress achieved in the Balkans, reflected in the increased
stability in the political and security arenas, allowed the two
long-standing and broadly based UN missions (UNMIBH and UNMOP)
to wind down in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, respectively.
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) assumed the tasks previously
undertaken by the police component (International Police Task
Force) of UNMIBH on 1 January 2003. As local institutional
capacities grew in the region, the need for large and open-ended
missions was not as great. Unfortunately, donor fatigue also
contributed to the international community’s reluctance
to maintain large missions. The NATO SFOR and KFOR missions completed
their phased drawdown of authorized troop strength to 12 000
and 30 000, respectively. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the third instalment of NATO’s engagement—Operation
Allied Harmony—was launched in December for a period of
six months. Similarly,
Timor-Leste’s largely smooth transition from a territory
under the administration of the UN to an independent state, in
May 2002, allowed for a correspondingly reduced international
presence. The initiation of UNMISET marked the termination of
UNTAET’s interim administration of East Timor and the gradual
devolution of authority to the Timorese Government. At the end
of the year, the Timor-Leste police force, which works in close
conjunction with UNMISET, was solely responsible for enforcing
the law in 4 of the 13 districts in the country. Peace-building
missions were given a new lease of life with the launch of UNAMA
in Afghanistan and UNMA in Angola. Both missions were given more
robust mandates and more resources and are ‘multidimensional’,
encompassing the various components of peace-building—immediate
humanitarian relief assistance, institution building, law and
order functions, and economic recovery. Despite the
differences in mandate and structure, the four new missions initiated
in 2002 shared one commonality—they were all designed to
play a secondary role to the host government and to let the countries
in question take ownership of the transition process. Appendix
3A, by Sharon Wiharta,
The International Criminal Court The year 2002
was a watershed for the International Criminal Court (ICC). After
several years of drawn-out negotiations and drafting, the world’s
first permanent international legal entity tasked to deal with
war-related crimes formally came into being on 1 July 2002. Approximately
half of the ratifications enabling the Statute to enter into
force were deposited after 1 January 2002. At the First Assembly
in September 2002, states parties agreed a budget for the court
and a process for nominating judges. The first 18 judges were
elected in March 2003. However, the
establishment of the ICC has continued to be controversial, with
many states opposed to its creation, and the USA one of its strongest
opponents. The ICC was made a political pawn between its proponents
and opponents and the USA took several steps to dilute the effectiveness
of the court and shield its citizens from its jurisdiction. In
the post-11 September 2001 context, and by virtue of its superpower
status, the USA sees itself as particularly vulnerable to politically
motivated prosecutions. In May, the US administration rescinded
its signature of the Statute. Other measures included passing
into law the American Service Members’ Protection Act (ASPA),
which denies military aid to those non-NATO states that choose
to ratify the Statute; restricting US participation in UN peace
missions; threatening to veto the extension of the UN Mission
in Bosnia and Herzegovina unless UN peacekeepers were granted
immunity from prosecution by the ICC; and negotiating bilateral
waiver agreements with several states. The European
Union, on the other hand, made several efforts to promote the
early ratification of the Statute and to ensure the survival
of the ICC. Policy directives and a Common Position were adopted
to support the establishment of the court. However, the strength
of the EU’s commitment to the ICC, and its political cohesiveness,
was put to the severest test when the USA approached several
member states to sign waiver agreements. This created a rift
in transatlantic relations and resulted in a shaky start to the
ICC.
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