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| by
Ian
Anthony,
Alyson
J.K Bailes,
Shannon
N. Kile
and Zdzislaw Lachowski About the authors |
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* Chapter
summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: New US strategy
documents adopted in 2002 allow for military action—pre-emptive
where necessary—against ‘asymmetrical’ threats
posed by terrorists and weapons of mass destruction as one means
to an explicit goal of preserving US military supremacy. They
prescribe the transformation of US national forces with emphasis
on strike capabilities, active and passive defences, and responsive
infrastructure. During the year the USA pursued its military
action in Afghanistan, acquired bases and military partners in
new regions and launched an ambitious homeland security programme
under a new single department. In March President Bush declared
his determination to stop the threat from Iraq, with prime reference
to Saddam Hussein’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Widespread international concerns were voiced about the consequences,
legal propriety and relative priority of an attack on Iraq, and
during the autumn the USA consented to work with other UN Security
Council members for a UN resolution sending international inspectors
back to the country instead. By the end of the year they had
made no clear findings, while Saddam continued a policy of denial. US–European
relations were strained on a number of global policy issues besides
Iraq. The US administration’s emphasis on ‘coalitions
of the willing’ raised fears of its breaking away from alliances
and legal constraints, while US thinkers derided Europe’s
inability either to wield power or to understand it. Nonetheless,
during 2002 factors of calculation or loyalty kept both sides
working for compromises—fragile though these would soon
prove. NATO and the
EU had a triple agenda: enlargement, adaptation and the management
of the Balkans (where a trend to shift responsibility to the
EU emerged by the end of the year). NATO invited seven new members
to join in 2004, including the Baltic states, with minimal Russian
protest. It adopted decisions opening the way for worldwide deployments,
and a package of measures in November (a new Capabilities Commitment,
a new Response Force and a new command structure) potentially
providing tools for them. US–European tensions persisted,
however, and the principal blockage to full NATO support for
EU military operations was removed only after mid-December. The EU invited
10 new members (including Malta and Cyprus) to join in 2004,
gave Romania and Bulgaria a 2007 target and—after difficult
discussions—agreed to define Turkey’s target date in
late 2004 if reforms have progressed far enough. It opened a
new-style European Convention to discuss the Union’s adaptation
for the future, including a possible ‘constitution’.
The EU and NATO also reflected on new ‘outreach’ policies
and structures after enlargement to promote partnership with,
and contain instability from, new neighbour regions to the east
and south. In Russia,
President Putin developed a personal strategy increasingly anchored
in the West, conserving Russia’s limited energies for internal
growth and acknowledging the common nature of many global threats.
Realist but not yet deep-rooted, this policy brought Russia some
rewards in 2002 for its acceptance inter alia of US missile defence
plans, NATO enlargement and US bases in Central Asia. The policy
did not, however, achieve true US–Russian equality or dispose
of all disagreements. Russia handled its internal conflicts as
a ‘terrorist’ challenge, opting for an imposed military
and political solution in Chechnya, especially after a costly
hostage incident in October, and threatening cross-border strikes
into Georgia. Russia secured
a new consultative relationship ‘at 20’ with NATO when
the NATO–Russia Council was inaugurated in May, with an
agenda including cooperation on ‘new threats’. Kaliningrad
became the main bone of contention regarding EU expansion plans,
but after eventful negotiations an EU package of measures to
ease Russian citizens’ transit from and to the exclave was
accepted in November. Russia took steps in Central Asia, notably
emphasizing the collective security functions of the Commonwealth
of Independent States, to signal its continuing claim to influence
there. Appendix
1A, by Jinmi Adisa, The African Union: the vision, programme,
policies and challenges The African
Union (AU) replaced the Organization for African Unity as a more
cohesive and integrated African organization. At the time of
transition, the continent was racked by a series of internal
conflicts that threatened to undermine the viability of any sustained
regional agenda. Disputed electoral outcomes have been a major
source of political tension. The AU is also concerned with the
issue of terrorism. The degree of international support will
be a crucial factor in the implementation of the AU’s agenda.
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